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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

statute even though the contract were made in England. Certain steps
were taken by the defendant in Georgia which resulted in a violation of
the Georgia law. After all, these statutes providing punishments and
penalties for gambling were enacted for the purpose of stamping out
this vice, and in view of this policy, the law should not present the
opportunity of easy evasion which exists if the gambler is allowed to
escape merely because the bet was actually accepted in another state.
N. A. TOWNSEND, JR.

Municipal Corporations-Power to Regulate TaxicabsRequirement for Indemnity Bond.
A city was given power by its charter "to license and regulate all
vehicles operated for hire in the city." Held, the city was without
authority to require taxicab operators to provide liability insurance or
bond to protect the public against negligent operation of the cabs. 1

In reaching this result the court based its decision on the principle
that a municipal corporation possesses only those powers expressly
granted, necessarily implied, or essential to its declared objects. 2 But
the great majority of courts, although reciting this formula, have reached
results contra to that of the instant case and have upheld similar ordinances under grants of power no more extensive than that involved in
the principal case. Ordinances requiring indemnity bonds of taxicab
operators have been upheld under grants of power to "collect a license
tax on and regulate hacks," 3 "to regulate the use of streets, '

4

"to reg-

ulate every description of carriages which may be kept for hire," 5 and
In the light of these
"to license, tax, and regulate public hackmen."'
decisions the court in the principal case seems to adopt an unnecessarily
I State v. Gulledge, 208 N. C. 204, 179 S. E. 883 (1935). The same ordinance
was before the court in State v. Saseen, 206 N. C. 644, 174 S. E. 142 (1934), and
was held invalid on constitutional grounds. For a comment attacking that decision
see (1935) 13 N. C. L. REv. 222. The constitutional objections were removed from
the ordinance before the instant case arose.
'Detroit Citizens Street Railway Co. v. Detroit Railway, 171 U. S. 48, 18 Sup.
Ct. 732, 43 L. ed. 67 (1897) ; Smith v. New Bern, 70 N. C. 14 (1874) ; 1 DILLON,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) §237.
'Ex parte Counts, 39 Nev. 61, 153 Pac. 93 (1915).
'City of New Orleans v. Le Blanc, 139 La. 113, 71 So. 248 (1915) ; Fenwick
v. City of Klamath Falls, 135 Or. 571, 297 Pac. 838 (1931) ; Greene v. City of
San Antonio, 178 S. W. 6 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); Ex parte Sullivan, 77 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 72, 178 S. W. 537 (1915); Ex parte Bogle, 78 Tex. Crim. Rep. 1, 179
S. W. 1193 (1915) ; Note (1926) 25 MIcH. L. R-v. 81. In Ex parte Cardinal, 170
Cal. 519, 150 Pac. 348 (1915), an ordinance requiring indemnity bond of taxicab
operators was upheld under the city's implied -police power to regulate the streets;
the ordinance was described as being "purely regulatory in its nature."
IWillis v. City of Fort Smith, 121 Ark. 606, 182 S. W. 275 (1916) ; Commonwealth v. Kelley, 229 Ky. 722, 17 S. W. (2d) 1017 (1929); Ex parte Dickey, 76
W. Va. 576,85 S. E. 781 (1915).
1 Sprout v. City of South Bend, 198 Ind. 563, 153 N. E. 504 (1926).
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strict construction of charter powers in order to deny a city power to
adopt a socially desirable ordinance.8
In these days of constantly expanding governmental functions it becomes increasingly necessary for the state to delegate to municipal corporations ever larger powers of control over matters of local interest.
If the ultra-strict construction of charter powers expressed in the principal case is followed, it will not be possible by general language to give
municipal corporations that plenary power which may be desired in a
particular field. Instead, it will be necessary to include in city charters
a particularized statement of each item of power granted. This would
produce two undesirable results: first, it would necessitate that municipal charters be tremendously bulky and detailed documents; and second, in spite of the greatest legislative foresight, in every such attempt
at enumeration there is always danger of omission of things intended
to be included. 9
Adherence to the strict construction of the principal case will go far
to paralyze cities attempting to operate under existing charters. Many
city ordinances now in force would have to be declared invalid if attacked.10 In passing new ordinances the cities may be impelled, in order
to insure their validity, to run to the state for particular grants of
7State eV rel. Johnson v. Bates, 161 Tenn. 211, 30 S. W. (2d) 248 (1930),

cited by the court in the principal case to support its decision, is distinguishable.
There the charter granted power to the municipality "to regulate the running of
automobiles." It was held that this referred to traffic rules regulating the speed
and movement of automobiles on the city streets and did not confer power upon
the city to exact security for the benefit of passengers using the automobiles.
The charter provision involved in the instant case was "to regulate all vehicles,"
not "to regulate the running of vehicles."
"Where in its nature an
B The idea of requiring a bond is not a new one.
occupation is apt to cause injury to others, such a bond has frequently been required. And the jitneysy present such an obviously -proper case for an application
of this principle that this requirement has been unhesitatingly indorsed." Note
(1916) 38 HARv. L. REv. 437.
SThis is particularly true since the rule of interpretation that the specific
enumeration of certain powers impliedly excludes those not mentioned would be
applied in such a case. Grand Rapids v. Hughes, 15 Mich. 54 (1860) ; State v.
Ferguson, 33 N. H. 424 (1856).
A logical application of the reasoning of the instant case would result in
invalidation of many types of ordinances passed under general grants of power.
As an illustration, by the terms of N. C. CODE (1935) §2623-6 "a city or town is
authorized to grant upon reasonable terms franchises for public utilities." Under
authority of this statute a city, in an ordinance granting a franchise to a street
railway company, included a provision fixing the maximum rate which could be
charged for carrying a -passenger within the city. CODE OF CITY OF CAmRToE
(1931) §435d(f). Under the reasoning of the principal case such a provision
might be invalid because the power to enact it was not in specific terms granted
to the city. Also, the instant case would seem to directly affect the validity of
ordinances of the cities of Asheville, Greensboro, Winston-Salem, and Raleigh
requiring taxicab operators to file indemnity insurance or bond. ORDINANCE OF
CITY OF AsnEvLL, April 20, 1933; ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF GREENsBORO
(1930) c. 37, §7; ORDINANCES OF WINSTON-SALEM (1926) §178; CoNsoLmATED
ORDINANCES OF CIT OF RALEIGH (1929) c. 15, §26.
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power, thus further consuming the time of the legislature with purely
local problems. A more reasonable construction of charter powers
would obviate these harmful results.
F. M. PARKER.
Taxation-Trusts--Power to Tax Interest of Beneficiary.
An Ohio statute1 levied a tax on all investments from which income
is derived, excepting interests in land, but expressly not excepting equitable interests in land divided into shares evidenced by transferable certificates. Plaintiff, a resident of Ohio, was the owner of transferable
land trust certificates in seven separate trusts, 2 four of which consisted

of office building properties in Ohio, the other three outside of Ohio.
Plaintiff claimed that his certificates represented an interest in land, and
that the tax on the Ohio trusts violated the uniformity clause of the
Ohio constitution3 because the land had already been taxed against the
trustee, and in the case of the out-of-state trusts, the tax was a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution as a tax on
land outside the jurisdiction of Ohio. The Supreme Court of Ohio
sustained the tax in each instance.4 The decision was reversed by the
Supreme Court of the United States, three justices dissenting.5
There is presented here the question of the power of a state to tax
the beneficiary's equitable interest in a trust, and whether that power
may be affected by the nature of the trust and the composition of the
res.
"'Investments' defined. §5323. The term 'investments' as used in this title includes the following: . . . Annuities, royalties and other contractual obligations
for the periodical payment of money and all contractual and other incorporeal
rights of a pecuniary nature whatsoever from which income is or may be derived,
however evidenced, excepting (1) patents and copyrights and royalties derived
from each, (2) interests in land and rents and royalties derived therefrom, other
than equitable interests divided into shares evidenced by transferable certificates."
115 LAws OF OHio 552 et seq. (1933).
2 The trusts were all similar but entirely separate. There was no connection
between managements. Parcels of land were severally conveyed to trustees, each
trustee holding but one parcel and, by the terms of the trust agreement, undertaking to hold and manage the property, to receive the income and pay it over
ratably to the certificate owners. If the lands were sold under the existing options the proceeds were likewise to be ratably distributed. Each owner of a certificate was registered on the books of the trustee, but had no right to possession
or partition, and had no control over the trustee. The certificates were freely
transferable. For more detailed information on the usual set-up for Ohio land
trust certificates see Goldman and Abbott, Land Trust Certificateswith Relation to
Ohio Law (1928) 2 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 255.
Land and improve,Art. XII, §2 of the Constitution of Ohio provides, "...
ments thereon shall be taxed by uniform rule according to value." Apparently
this view had been previously accepted by the Attorney General of Ohio. See the
principal case, infra note 5. 55 Sup. Ct. 800, 803, 79 L. ed. (Ad. opinions) 863,
866. See also OHIO GENERAL CODE (1929) §§710-140 (d).
'Senior v. Braden, 128 Ohio 597, 193 N. E. 614 (1934).
1 Senior v. Braden, 55 Sup. Ct. 800, 79 L. ed. (Ad. opinions) 863 (U. S. 1935).

